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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal by the Plaintiff, Margaret Reynolds,
from a verdict and judgment entered in the District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, finding the issues in
favor of the Defendants W. W. Clyde & Co., and Fred Gray,
for no cause of action in a suit filed by the plaintiff against
the defendants for injuries to the plaintiff caused by the
alleged negligence of the defendants. Plaintiff will be hereinafter referred to as the appellant, and the defendant will
be hereinafter referred to as the respondents.
The appellant filed an action in the District court of
Salt Lake County, on October 7, 1953, alleging that on the
17th day of September, 1953, at 7:00 a.m., the appellant
W. W. Clyde and Co., was engaged in constructing approaches to an overpass West of U. S. Highway 91 in the
vicinity of Becks Hot Springs in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, and at the said time and place the respondent,
Fred Gray was an employee of the Respondent W. W. Clyde
& Co. and among the duties of the employment of Fred
Gray was that of stopping traffic along U.S. highway 91
to allow the earth-moving vehicles and equipment of W. W.
Clyde and Co., to cross the highway free from interference
of the general traffic on said highway; that the appellant
at the time was driving an automobile Northerly along the
East side of U.S. Highway 91, and slowed down upon arriving at the crossing; that the respondent, Fred Gray began waving a red flag in such a manner that the appellant
reasonably assumed that he intended for the appellant to
continue forward rather than to stop; that the plaintiff
continued forward and as her vehicle passed_ the respondent
Fred Gray, the flag of the respondent negligently contacted
the two side windows on the right side of the vehicle
2
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driven by appellant violently shattering the glass and
startling the plaintiff to the extent that the appellant
became unnerved, frightened, upset and excited causing
the appellant to temporarily lose control of the vehicle
which veared to the West toward oncoming traffic before
the plaintiff regained sufficient stability to right the course
of the automobile, all of which caused the twisting, dis ..
location, and concussion of the plaintiff's back and nervous
system.
The complaint and the amended complaints alleged in
different counts that the acts of Fred Gray, were willful
and wanton, but during the trial it was stipulated between
the attorneys for the respective parties that the issue vvould
be tried solely on the question of negligence.
The evidence was undisputed that the appellant was
examined by Dr. Robert Lamb on September 25, 1953,
who diagnosed an injury consisting of a protruded intervertebral disc, at the lumbarsacral joint (R 37). The non
surgical treatment failed to correct the injury and on May
21, 1954, appellant was admitted to the hospital for excision of this protruded disc (R 41). The undisputed evidence further shows that the appellant spent $1477.30
for doctors, hospital, and drug charges in connection with
the treatment of the injury to her back.
The appellant testified that on the morning of September 17, 1953, she v;as traveling Northerly on U.S. Highway 91, going from Salt Lake City to her place of employment 'in Bountiful; that U.S. Highway 91, at the vicinity
of Becks Crossing is a four-lane highway; that if the lanes
were numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4, starting from East to West,
the appellant was traveling in lane 1 (R 18); that as appellant approached Becks Crossing she slowed down antici3
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pating the presence of the flagman; that the flagman was
standing on the East side of the highway on the shoulder,
just off the pavement; that the flagman had a red flag on
the end of a pole and was waving it in a direction parallel
with the road and holding the flag down below his waist
(R 20); that another vehicle was proceeding ahead of the
appellant in the same direction and the appellant assumed
that the flagman was waving appellant to proceed forward;
that appellant proceeded forward in lane 1, and as she
passed the flagman, she noticed from the corner of her
eye that the flag pole of the flagman struck the wind wing
of the car shattering the right front window of the car
(R 20); that the noise of impact and shattering glass
frightened and unnerved the appellant so that she lost
control of her car to the extent that her car was in lane
3 before she could right it and turn back to the right hand
side of the road (R 21); that appellant's left hip bumped
against the arm rest on the door as she was turning the
vehicle; that the South bound traffic in lanes 3 and 4 were
approaching and moving at the same time that appellant
was traveling North and there were no earth moving vehicles or trucks crossing the highway at that time; that
appellant stopped on the East side of the road a short distance from the flagman and then proceeded another hundred and fifty feet or so, noticed her arm was bleeding,
stopped, got out, and brushed glass from the seat (R 22);
that she then proceeded to Bountiful, to her place of employment and there informed her co-workers of the incident
and also notified the deputy marshal of Bountiful (R 23);
that upon arrival at Bountiful she felt pain in her lower
back region (R 23); that September 17, 1953, was Thursday;
that she continued at work Thursday and Friday but was
not able to report Saturday; that on Monday she was feeling
4
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badly and consulted Dr. Diumenti, (R 27) who referred her
to Dr. Lamb, who examined her on September 25, 1953,
and subsequently operated to excise the protruded disc
(R 37); that appellant had no previous injury to her back
which prevented her from doing her work and that she
was capable of doing all of her household chores and engage
in dancing and other types of recreation such as bowling
(R 61 & 62) ; that since September 17, 1953, appellant has
been unable to do anything which requires bertding, stoop-,
ing, or lifting (R 62).
Leo Monks, deputy marshal of Bountiful, Utah, was
called and testified that on September 17, 1953, he was
deputy marshal and was acquainted vvith the appellant
(R 85); that on said date there was a report made to him
regarding the incident on U.S. Highway 91, and that t~e
incident involved a flagman; that he inspected the automobile of Mrs. Reynolds at the time of the report and observed that the right front windovv on the right hand side
was cracked (R' 86) ; that at the time the report of the
incident was made by appellant to the marshal, the appellant appeared very nervous, upset, and shaky, in contrast
to her usual calm appearance; that the incident was reported to the marshal between 8:00 and 9:00 o'clock of
September 17, 1953 (R 87).
Ronald Bradshaw, manager and owner of the Intermountain Glass Co., at Bountiful, testified that sometime
during the middle of September, 1953, a vehicle was brought
to him by Mrs. Reynolds for purposes of glass replacement
(R 90) ; that the right ventilator glass on the vehicle was
quite badly shattered and the door glass was cracked; that
he replaced both the ventilator glass and the door glass
(R 91).

5
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One of the respondents, Fred Gray, was called as an
adverse witness by the appellant (R 95). The respondent,
Fred Gray, was the only eye witness to the incident which
was the subject of the action. Gray testified that he was
first employed by W. W. Clyde on August 3, 1953 (R 95);
that he was assigned to the job of flagging traffic on the
.highway was given a stop sign and a red flag as equipment
(R 97) ; that the stop sign was only used for a short period
and then was discontinued and was not being used at the
time of this the incident which was the subject of this action; that he continued to work flagging traffic until December 4, 1953 (R 103); that he remembered an incident when a
lady driving an automobile passed his flag and then stopped
a fe\v feet down the road; that she was traveling in lane
1, when Gray stepped out to flag between lane # 1 and 2,
and that the lady ran through his flag (R 106); that Gray
was flagging by waving his right arm up and down holding
the flag; that Gray said he did not know whether the
vehicle struck the flag (R 106); that after the lady passed,
she ran up on the second lane and continued up the road
about a hundred feet from where Gray stood and got out
of her car on the right side (R 107) ; that this lady did not
return to have any conversation with Gray (R 107); that
the only other experience Gray ever had was when a lady
ran through his flag and then came back to apologize for
running through the flag (R 107). On direct examination,
Mr. Gray was asked the following question:
Q. Mr. Gray, you said that you never did feel any
impact between your stick and the automobile, is
that right, at any time?
A. No, if anything like that happened it was an
accident because she run through my flag and I
was trying to stop her and if I hit the car, I hit it
accidentally. (R 109)
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then Gray further testified as follows: (R 109)
Q. Do you know whether or not you contacted
the car?
A. No, I don't.
Q. You don't ever remember feeling it?
A. No.
Q. You said you watched this lady go off to the
east side of the road and stop?
A. Yes.
Q. Why did you watch her?
A. Because I was watching them loads coming
down the hill and I was watching where she was
going. I was wondering "'here she was going.
Q. Why were you watching the loads, coming
down the hill?
A. Because we had all the traffic stopped. He
had his traffic stopped and I had mine stopped and
she was the only one that went through my flag.
Q. Did she stop at any time?
A. No. Until she got up there and stopped
about a hundred feet from where I was standing.
Q. She never stopped at any time?
A. No.
Q. She came right on through lane two and went
on by you?
A. Yes.
Q. You said all the traffic was stopped?
A. They was. The outside lane. And I was in
there standing there, standing at the middle between one and two and when she come through I
was trying to flag her and she was the only car that
went through.
Q. Did she dodge you to get through?
A. I stepped back.
Q. You stepped back; what for?
7
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A. So she wouldn't run over me. I was standing
right on that between the two lanes one and two.
Q. You were standing between the two lanes and
where was she?
A. I was standing right on that line between one
and two.
Q. You would say on the line that divides lane
one and two?
A. Yes.
Q. Where was her automobile? ,
A. It came up the second lane and went up there
and crossed over and stopped.
Q. Were there any cars stopped in lane one?
A. Yes sir, there were cars stopped, and there
wasn't a car-this car up above is all.
Q. You were standing right on the line between
lane one and two?
A. Yes.
Q. You hp.d to step back from that line in order to
keep from getting hit?
A. Yes, I wasn't going to stand there and let her
run over me.
Gray further testified that he was the only watchman
ever on duty at the south end of the road during the
period (R 110).
The cause was submitted to the jury by instruction
essentially i= embracing negligence and contributary negligence. The jury tvas polled} and the results thereof
sho·wed · six in favor of the decision and two opposed.
CR 203).

The appellant then moved the court as follows:
1. To set aside the verdict of the jury, and any
judgment· entered thereon, and to enter judgment in favor
of the plaintiff.
8
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2. If the court does not see fit to grant the relief
requested in paragraph 1, hereof, plaintiff moves the court
for an order granting a new trial herein for the reason that
the verdict is against the evidence and is not justified by
the evidence adduced in this cause.
STATEMENT OF POINTS

Point I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION
OF THE APPELLANT TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT
OF THE JURY AND TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF THE PLAINTIFF.

Point ll
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION
OF THE APPELLANT FOR AN ORDER GRANTING A
NEW TRIAL FOR THE REASON THAT THE VERDICT
WAS AGAINST THE EVIDENCE.
ARGUMENT

Point I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION
OF THE APPELLANT TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT
OF THE JURY AND TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR
OF THE PLAINTIFF.
In this case the jury in order to find in favor of the

respondent for no cause of action would have to find either
9
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(A) That no such incident as claimed by the appellant
transpired or
(B) That the appellant, herself was contributo~y negligent.
The statement of facts (supra) set forth the appellants
version of how the defendant, Gray's flag contacted the
windows of her vehicle, and her testimony as to the damage
was confirmed by the testimony of the deputy marshal,
Leo Monks, and the glass repairman, Ronald Bradshaw.
The only other evidence of the incident was given by the
respondent, Gray. The respondent, Gray, testified (R 105)
that he recalled an incident when a lady driving an automobile passed his flag signal and then stopped a few feet
down the road; that he couldn't remember the date or the
day of the week; that he did not talk to the lady; that the
lady ran through his flag, and that he doesn't remember
if her car struck the flag as she passed; that she was in the
second lane, and after she ran by, she cut across and went
up about a hundred feet from where he stood and got out
of her car on the right side; that the lady did not come
back to talk to him; that the only other experience he
ever remembers was when a lady ran though his flag and
stopped on the side of the road and then came back and
apologized, but he knew of no other instances.
The respondent, Gray, further testified as set forth in
the statement of facts (supra-R 109). There can be little
doubt that the respondent, Gray, was relating the same
incident to which the appellant had reference. Apparently
the incident was so significant that the respondent, Gray,
remembered in considerable detail just what had transpired,
even though he had been on duty since August 3, 1953, as a
flagman on a heavily traveled U.S. Highway 91.
10~
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Therefore, if the jury concluded that the incident did
not happen at all, their decision is not supported by the
evidence in any respect and should have been set aside.
As to the problem of whether or not the jury could
have found the appellant guilty of contributary negligence,
the respondent, Gray, was a private citizen, not a police
officer, directing traffic solely for the benefit of his employer. While the respondent may have had a contractual
responsibility to regulate and protect the public by use of
a flagman, this responsibility did not include police power,
and the respondent \Vas acting as a private citizen in the
performance of the flagging operations. Assuming then
that the respondent vvas flagging properly and not ambiguously, and that the appellant disregarded the signal,
the appellant would not have been under any legal duty
to heed the signal of the respondent, a private citizen.
(Sadlowski vs. Meeron, et al., Mich 306, 215 N W 422).
The appellant's testimony was that the respondent's flag
was down at his side at the time she started to pass the
respondent (R 20); whereas the respondent Gray, testified
that he was standing between lanes one and two and that
as appellant approached, respondent stepped back in order
to keep from getting hit (R 110), and that if there were
any impact between the stick and the automobile, it was
an accident, because appellant ran through the flag and
respondent was trying to stop her, and if respondent hit
the appellant's car he hit it accidentally (R 109 lines 1
to 5).
The respondent, Gray's, testimony was such that it
is difficult to determine what his impression of the incident
really was. If in fact, the respondent, Gray, stepped back
as the appellant's car approached, there would have been
11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

no contact at all between the respondent's flag and the
appellant's car; while the respondent was reluctant to
admit any contact between the. flag and the car, the incident of the lady passing through and stopping on the east
side. of .the road was sufficiently clear in his mind in detail
and he was willing to admit that if his flag did hit the car,
it hit accidentally. To avoid the flag contacting the appellant's car, the respondent need only to have lowered the
flag. Respondent, Gray, said he had traffic stop in lane 1,
and that he was standing on the line between lane 1 and 2,
and that as appellant came by, the appellant stepped back
to keep from getting hit. If this were true, the appellant's
car could not have come near enough to respondent to contact the flag, since the respondent testified that the appellant was always in lane two. The only conceiveable
way that the jury could have found the plaintiff guilty of
contributory negligencce would be a situation \vhere the
respondent, Gray, would be standing with his flag extended
horizontally at about the level of the windows of the automobile, and that the appellant, having sufficient time and
opportunity to stop or otherwise avoid the flag, nevertheless drove against the flag; but nowhere in the evidence
can the existence of this situation be found.
In a£parent disregard of the necessity to avoid ambiguity ~ signaling, the respondent, Gray, testified that
the stop sign which was given to him by his employer to
use in conjunction with the flag, which had clearly written
on it the word stop, was not used by the respondent, Gray,
after about a week (R 98) and that the respondent, Gray,
discontinued the use of said sign upon his own initiative
and without the instruction of his employer.

12
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Point

n

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION OF THE APPELLANT FOR AN ORDER GRANTING A NEW TRIAL FOR THE VERDICT WAS AGAINST
THE EVIDENCE.
The argument advanced in support of point # 1 should
apply with even greater force and affect to this argument
under point #2. The duty of a trial judge in considering a
motion for new trial is set forth in King v Union R. R. Co.
-U-, 212 P2d 692, at page 696, where this court held as
follows:
''The duty of a trial judge in considering a
motion for a new trial was well stated in Nelson v
Angeles Hospital Ass'n of Los Angeles, 23 Cal. App.
2d 71, 72 P. 2d 169, 171. There the court said:
" 'The law is well established that, on consideration of a motion for a new trial on the ground of
insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict
or decision, a trial court is not particularly concerned with the fact (if it so appear) that *** the
evidence is 'conflicting.' To the contrary, notwithstanding any such conflict, or even though the
apparent weight of the evidence should be in support of the 'verdict or decision,' since it is the
personal duty of the trial judge to weigh and to
consider the evidence and to reach a just conclusion
thereon, if he be satisfied that the verdict or de-

cision in question is not in fact supported by the
evidence} or that it is contrary to the weight of the
evidence} he is not only authorized} but it is his
bounden duty to grant a motion for a new trial.
20 Cal. Jur. 117, 118, and authorities there cited.
In such a situation, on appeal from the order, all
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that is required to sustain it is the fact that the
record discloses substantial evidence in support of
the conclusion that has been reached by the trial
court in that respect.' ''
The· trial judge in the instant case at the time of
hearing on the motion for a new trial stated that while,
as a trier of fact he may have reached a different conclusion,
yet he did not feel that the trial judge should substitute his
own opinion or judgment for that of the jury. If this were
the position to be taken by all trial judges, there would be
no in~tance in which the court would grant a new trial.
It would seem then that the trial court should have exercised his duty to grant the motion for a new trial if the
verdict were against the weight of the evidence, and failure
to do so is an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the cause should be
remanded to the lower court for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE K. FADEL
Bountiful, Utah
RAYMOND R. BRADY
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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